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Municipal Corporations-Liability for Injuries at Municipal Airport.-
[Georgia] Plaintiff rode out to defendant's airport on a motorcycle with a
passenger. After finishing a conversation with a city employee, plaintiff
started back to the city on the pavement inside the airport. When the motor-
cycle struck a broken part of the pavement, plaintiff :was thrown and
severely injured. Plaintiff alleged that the city permitted the pavement to
become broken, defective and dangerous and that the holes existed for such
a length of time that the defendant was charged with notice thereof, and
was therefore negligent in failing to keep the pavement in a safe and suitable
condition for persons operating vehicles over it. The city demurred con-
tending that its operation of the airport was a governmental function and
hence there could be no liability while acting in this capacity. The trial
court overruled the demurrer and the city excepted. The appellate court
reversed and entered judgment for the city. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons,
189 S. E. 63 (Ct. App. Ga. 1936).
The court's decision that the airport is to be considered in the nature of a
park in the discharge of its "governmental" duty, thus preventing any liability
attaching, raises the long controverted issue of whether or not a partidular
function carried on by a municipality is, on the one hand, "sovereign," "gov-
ernmental," "political," or is, on the other hand, "corporate," "proprietary,"
"municipal."] Once the function is labeled, the result as concerns tort lia-
bility is well known. Courts have, nevertheless, experienced great difficulty
in applying these categories to a particular set of facts for the distinction is at
best shadowy, vague and uncertain.2 Thus it is not unnatural for courts in
separate jurisdictions to reach contrary conclusions as to whether or not
similar enterprises are corporate or governmental. Though there are several
tests which courts use in deciding into which category the function belongs,
it seems as though many courts first determine whether liability ought to
exist and then use these words to rationalize the conclusion. There is, how-
ever, the danger that some courts might place a particular set of facts in one
1. A similar controversy arose in City of Blackwell V. Lee, 62 P. (2d) 1219
(Okla. 1936) where plaintiff's plane was burned in the hangar of a municipal
airport. The court held the defendant liable, stating that it operated the air-
port in a proprietary capacity. The entire problem is adequately covered in
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 365 (1930) which discusses Mobile v. Lartigue, 127 So.
257 (Ala. App. 1930). See note. 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 436 (1931) discussing
Coleman v. Oakland, 64 Cal. App. 732, 295 Pac. 59 (1931). Other cases raising
the problem are: Mollencop v. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d) 783
(1932) ; Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 P. (2d) 1098
(1936). See also. Hubbard, MacClintock and Williams, Airports (1930). Dodd-
ridge, in his article "Distinction between Governmental and Proprietary Func-
tions of Municipal Corporations," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925), points out that
there are six types of cases in which the distinction is met: eminent domain,
execution upon property, taxation, alienation of property, cases concerning power
of legislature over property, and tort liability. The distinction has its greatest
bearing in the field of tort.
2. It is difficult to announce a rule as to Just where the liability of a
municipality commences or where it ceases. Lynch v. North Yakima, 37 Wash.
657, 661, 80 P. 79 (1905). See Dillon, Municipal Corporations, (5th ed. 1911)
§1625; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1913) §2625.
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of the categories without first giving due consideration to the question of
liability. The court should not use any of the above mentioned devices to
evade the responsibility of a municipality, but should treat the situation as an
ordinary tort case.3
For many years, writers in this field of municipal responsibility have
attempted to change the doctrine that government and its agencies are immune
from tort liability.4 This immunity is founded upon ancient concepts: first,
there is the maxim in English law that the King can do no wrong; second,
there is the danger of multiplicity of suits against the various members
composing the municipality; third, no profit accrues to the city from certain
functions; fourth, liability would tend to retard the agents of the city in the
performance of their duties; fifth, it is better that the individual should
suffer loss rather than that the public should suffer inconvenience. These
arguments have all been refuted in the light of modern concepts that tort is
not only a legal, but a moral obligation.5 Neither reason nor policy dictates
a rule giving municipal corporations immunity from its torts. The tendency
now seems to be to hold municipal corporations to stricter accountability, for
the municipality must assume responsibility for the position it occupies in
society." In view of this diminishing scope of governmental immunity from
tort the possibility of airports receiving such benefit is very slight.7  To
counteract such modern advancement in the branch of tort law, some states by
statute provide that the municipality shall in no case be liable for injuries
occurring in the operation of an airport.8 This appears unjust and retro-
gressive.. The most equitable course would be to have the states adopt the
policy of the Uniform Airports Act9 which leaves the determination of lia-
3. In Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, 99 S. W. (2d) 557 (Ct. App. Tenn.1935), plaintiff claimed that injuries sustained by him and the death of plain-
tiff's intestate were caused by the negligence of the defendants. The court
treated the case as an ordinary tort case and submitted the issue of negligence
to the Jury.
4. Professor Borchard traces the entire doctrine from its ihiception to itspresent status. His research is sure to prove of benefit to future enlightened
courts. Borchard, "Government Responsibility in Tort," 28 Col. L. Rev. 577-607.
735-776 (1928) ; 34 Yale L. J. 1-45, 129-143. 229-258 (1924) ; 36 Yale L. J. 1-41,757-807, 1037-1100 (1926). See also, Laski, "The Responsibility of the StatesIn England," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447 (1919) ; Moore, "Liability for Acts of PublicServants," 23 L. Q. Rev. 12 (1907); "Liability for Acts of Public Servants,"
23 L. Q. Rev. 12 (1907).
5. Doddridge, cited supra note 1, points out that the idea of divine rights
of kings has no place in the present law of corporations, that modern ideasdictate that loss be spread over society as much as possible, that thought of suit
against a third party is not a very cogent deterrent of the actor. Harno, in his
article on "Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations," 4 Ill. L. Q. 28 (1921),
states that the doctrine of immunity was first recognized in Russell v. Men of
Devon, 2 T. R. 667; 100 Eng. Repr. 359 (1798). He argues that fear of multi-plicity of suits was fear of separate suits against all inhabitants which has lost
Its force since Incorporation, that tort responsibility is never tested by benefit
from an act of the tort-feasor.
6. Price, "Governmental Liability for Tort in West Virginia," 38 W. Va.Law Q. 101 (1932) ; Barrett, "Distinction between Public and Private Functionsin Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Oregon," 11 Ore. L. Rev. 123, 133(1932) ; David, "Municipal Liability in Tort in California," 6 So. Calif. L. Rev.
269, 280 (1933); note, "The Distinction between Governmental and MunicipalFunctions as Applied in the Law of Torts." 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 555, 563 (1927).
7. Grover, "The Legal Basis of Municipal Airports," 5 JOUR1NAL OF Am LAW410 (1934) ; Fixel, "The Regulation of Airports," 1 JOURNAL or AIR LAW 483,489 (1930). An argument contra, Zollmann, "Airports," 13 Marq. L. Rev. 97
(1929).
8. Iowa Code (1935) c. 303-c. 1, §5903-c. 11; Laws, No. Dak. 1931, c. 92(1929) U. S. Av. R. 479; Texas Statutes (Vernon 1936) art. 1269h, §3 ; Wis-
consin Laws 1929, c. 464, §1.
9. 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 589 (1935). This has not as yet been adopted
by any state.
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bility to the courts rather than to give an absolute immunity by statute.
Perhaps the best means of protection to the municipal corporation would be
airport liability insurance which should be a prerequisite to the operation of
every municipal or county airport.10
EUGENE A. BuscH.*
Negligence-Carriers-Alleged Injury of Passengers in Transit-Duty
of Carrier to Warn Passengers of Rough Weather.-[Federal] The ques-
tion of the liability of air carriers for passengers' injuries received in transit
during rough weather arose for the second' time in the consolidated
cases of George P. Kimmel v. Pennsylvania Airlines and Transport Company;
Homer J. Byrd v. Pennsylvania Airlines and Transport Company, decided.
February 4, 1937, in the District Court of the United States for the District
of Columbia. The cases were tried to a jury and verdicts rendered for the
defendant. Appeals were taken but had not been perfected by March 25,
1937, according to the Clerk of the Court. Since the court is one of original
jurisdiction, the cases were unreported and the court's charge to the jury,
which contains the essentials of the cases, is therefore set out here in full:
Cox, J.: * **.
Now, of course, we all know that we are dealing here with an art that
is comparatively new. Men have for ages been traveling on the surface
of the earth and on the surface of the water. This new art takes men
traveling through the ocean of air that surrounds the earth. The art is still
no doubt in its infancy, but it is so far advanced that men are now engaged
in the business of transporting passengers through the air for hire and
become what we call carriers of passengers, required to serve all alike.
These carriers do not insure the safety of their passengers, but because
they are paid for their services and have control of their instrumentalities
of transportation in which they carry passengers, they are required to exercise
a very high degree of care for the safe transportation of their passengers.
Now, the duties of these carriers are defined in some of the instructions
which the Court has granted, most of which, I think, have been read to
you, but some of which I will read briefly again.
You are instructed that at the time of the injuries complained of by the
plaintiffs the defendant was a common carrier of passengers by airplane and
that the plaintiffs were passengers in one of these airplanes bound for
Cleveland, Ohio; that because of this relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiffs, it owed to the plaintiffs a duty to exercise in the operation of
the plane through its agents the highest degree of care and prudence com-
mensurate with the practical operation of the plane so as to avoid injuring
the plaintiffs. A failure on the part of the agents of the defendant to perform
this duty which they owed to their passengers would be negligence on the
part of the defendant.
Another instruction granted is as follows: The jury is instructed that if
you find that the ship in which the plaintiffs were passengers was in good
mechanical condition and handled by a careful and experienced pilot but that
the plaintiffs received injuries from a climatical condition which the pilot
could not have foreseen, taking into consideration the testimony of the
various witnesses and the United States weather reports, all the evidence
before you, your verdict must be for the defendant.
The jury is instructed that the pilot of the defendant's plane was only
required to exercise such care and skill as is ordinarily possessed by those
experienced skillful pilots engaged in the same business or art, and if he
10. 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 48 (1933) ; Grover, cited supra note 7, at 438.
* Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See Hope v. United Air Lines, Inc., in 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 132, 139(1937).
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exercised such care and skill in his operation of the plane he was not negli-
gent, although the accident might have been avoided if he had acted in a
different manner.
Now, you will note in this connection also that the mere happening of an
accident, any kind of an accident, does not prove negligence. Accidents are
happening all the time, of various kinds and in various places. The fact that
an accident happens does not prove that somebody failed to do his duty and
that that failure was the cause of the accident.
So the burden of proof always rests upon the plaintiff or the person
who comes making a charge that he has been injured due to negligence,
just as it does in this case.
You are instructed that the burden is upon the plaintiffs to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent and that the
negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of their injuries, and
if you find that the plaintiffs have failed to prove facts constituting negligence
on the part of the defendant, by a preponderance of the evidence, then your
verdict must be for the defendant.
That means that the person who charges another with failure in having
done his duty and so having produced harm, has the burden of convincing
you that the other person did not do his duty, because we all start out with
the presumption that every person has done his duty and that presumption
stands until the evidence convinces you to the contrary.
What I have been saying, of course, deals with negligence in general.
Now, here the specific charge of negligence which has been tried before
you is not that any action of the defendant pilots in the movement or move-
ments of the plane was the immediate producing cause of the injuries in this
case. There is no dispute from the evidence that the immediate producing
cause of the accident here was the action of a downdraft of air upon the
plane passing through it. This apparently caused the plane to descend
rapidly or to be deflected so violently that the plaintiffs were thrown from
their seats and injured.
The claim here is that the company's pilot could and ought to have
averted the effect of this shake-up of the passengers by warning them, par-
ticularly these plaintiffs, so that they could have strapped themselves in their
seats before the plane struck the downdraft. That is the real question in the
case and the only respect in which you can consider whether the pilot or co-
pilot or either of them was negligent; whether the conditions were such
preceding the accident as to impose upon them the duty of directing or
notifying the passengers to fasten their seat belts.
There is no claim and no evidence that the airplane was not in proper
condition or that the pilots did not properly and successfully fly it. Under
the practice of the company passengers were required to fasten their seat
belts when the plane was taking off or when it was landing. Of course,
the likelihood of danger under these circumstances, when the plane was
moving on the ground or landing on the ground-danger of a rough shaking
up of passengers-was recognized.
It seems also plain from the evidence in the case 'that passengers can
also be bumped about and injured while a plane is in the air as a result of
rough or turbulent conditions; but the passengers are not required under
ordinary conditions to keep their seat belts fastened after the plane is
straightened out on its course in the air.
I suppose this question has arisen in your mind as it has probably arisen
in all our minds: Why didn't the airplane company require the passengers
to keep on their belts all the time, or at least as much of the time as the
company could compel them to keep them on? We do not have to go into
the reason for that, however, for whatever the reason may be, the carriers
do not require it. No one has charged that the failure to require this is
negligence, and we assume that there are reasons for permitting the pas-
sengers to do as they please under ordinary and usual flying conditions, so
far as keeping their belts fastened or moving about the cabin is concerned.
Passengers are not chained down to their seats or anything of that sort in
modern airplanes. The passenger goes in there and moves about as he
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pleases, and he has a seat belt available to, fasten when he wants to, or to
make loose when he wants to, without any guidance or direction of the com-
pany by any rule or regulation, except when leaving the ground or getting
ready to land on the ground.
So, of course, with respect to that part of the situation, passengers must
assume as one of the risks or perils of their voyage the risk arising from
their belts being unfastened under ordinary and usual flying conditions. But
they do not assume the risk for the negligent failure of the carrier to advise
them of perils on account of approaching rough or turbulent air which
becomes known or indicated to the carrier, or the pilots. The pilots have
the means available to warn the passengers of the perils that the pilots expect,
and if the passengers know of such a condition they may be in a position
to fasten themselves in their seats and thus obtain the protection afforded by
reason of their seat belts.
The evidence shows that rough and bumpy weather may at times be
encountered without warning. So it is only at times when the pilots them-
selves, as reasonable men, have warning that rough or dangerous conditions
are about to be encountered or likely to be encountered that the duty arises
to warn the passengers.
The first question for you to determine, as it appears to me, is whether
there was anything in the situation as the plane approached the point of the
accident to warn the pilots that rough flying was about to be or was likely
to be encountered.
The second question would be whether the pilots had opportunity, if they
had such warning, to give the passengers timely warning after such a situa-
tion showing the probable danger arose.
Then there would be a third one: whether if timely warning had been
given them the injuries would have been averted by the passengers them-
selves.
Now, you are to consider how the situation actually appeared to the
pilot and co-pilot as reasonable men, and skilled pilots as they approached
the place of the accident. To do that you have to try to reconstruct the
picture there and put yourselves in the place of those pilots.
What were the weather conditions through which they had been travel-
ing? What does the evidence show about that? Of course, you have to
'try the case by the evidence. Just when did that accident occur and what
happened immediately before the accident?
Now, you have to bear in mind the speed of that plane. Planes fly with
great speed and great rapidity. They travel two or three times as fast as
railroad trains or automobiles. You have to keep in mind, as I have said,
the conditions through which they were passing and the degree of care,
which the pilots were required to exercise in carrying and transporting
passengers. Looking at the situation as reasonable and prudent pilots, was
there anything before them or in their course to suggest that rough and
turbulent weather Iikely to injure passengers was about to be or was likely
to be encountered?
Now, we know, of course, planes travel rapidly. The passengers as well
as the pilots know that. Your question is, how did the condition appear to the
pilots? Was there anything that would have required a reasonable pilot to
warn the passengers? Did any threatening condition appear in time for a
reasonable pilot to warn them of it and for them to act upon it?
If the evidence does not satisfy you on this point, of course, the plaintiff's
case would fail. You must be satisfied or convinced by the weight of the
evidence that the pilots failed to do their duty.
Did the plane go into a cloud or mist or rain, and if so, were the weather
conditions such prior to the accident as to put the pilots on notice of probable
rough or dangerous conditions so that they could and- should warn the pas-
sengers in time for them to fasten their seat belts Now, you have got to
determine the situation from the evidence before you and this, of course,
requires your careful consideration of all the evidence. I ask you to recall
and consider it all and try to reconstruct the picture as it presented itself to
the pilots as they approach the point of the accident.
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Now, that is going to require, of course, your examination of the evi-
dence. In this connection I will call your attention to the fact that you have
two kinds of evidence in the case:
The evidence that would fall in one division that deals with the situation
as it actually existed at that time and as the whole situation was presented:
the recorfds, reports, the witnesses that were there on the plane all had
something to tell you about the situation as the pilots were dealing with it.
That is as to what they could know at the time. The test is what a reasonable
man of care and prudence, a skilled pilot under those circumstances, ought
to have done.
Now, there is another class of witness that Were not there at all, experts
on both sides. They were not there on the scene. They know nothing about
what happened at all because they were not witnesses as to what occurred
any more than you were witnesses. They were called as what we call ex-
perts, and their purpose and function was to help you to interpret the evi-
dence that is before you. What goes on in the air, in the clouds, and'in the
operation of the plane, are matters that we are not conversant with, at least
most of us are not.
So they called men who have had experience in such business to give
their views as to the interpretation that ought to be put upon the evidence
as it was presented and as it was submitted to them in the questions
asked, so that they could give us some information about things we are
not familiar with, just to enable you to analyze and apply and test this evi-
dence in the light of their experience, which they, as it were, loaned to us
for the purpose of passing on these questions of fact.
Now, it is your duty, of course, to consider and give weight and regard
to all the evidence that has been adduced before you. There is one class
of evidence as to which a prayer was read to you that you can occasionally
totally discredit. That is covered by a prayer which reads:
If you believe a witness wilfully and deliberately testifies falsely upon
a matter about which he could not reasonably be mistaken, you are at liberty
to disregard any part or all of the testimony of that witness.
That means a man who deliberately falsifies puts himself in a position
where you have a right to discredit him entirely, throw his testimony out, or
take it for whatever you might think it is worth. Aside from that, it is the
duty of the jury to consider all the testimony that may be produced.
All honest witnesses are to be considered and you have a right to regard
and you should regard witnesses as honest until you are convinced to the
contrary. You may, of course, consider the interest that any witness has in
the matter and the natural tendency of witnesses to see and remember things
in a favorable light accordingly as they have or take an interest in one side
or the other. You may also bear in mind the opportunity of a witness to see
and observe the things that he testifies to, whether he was actually observing
at the time, whether he was really paying attention or not, whether he was
under a duty to pay attention at the time, whether he had the experience to
make him a competent observer, whether his attention was distracted at the
time by other things-all those matters you will take into consideration in
saying who was in the best position, who was best likely to observe, who
inspires you with the most confidence in matters that affect credibility or
weight of testimony, and that is to be looked at along with all the circum-
stances and details that indicate the matters that a witness carefully and
particularly observes.
Now, I call your attention to certain other instructions that have been
granted. You are instructed the defendant was not a guatantor or insurer
of the safety of the plaintiffs during the passage or the trip in question, but
that under the law it was only required to exercise the highest degree of
care in the management and control of said plane consistent with the prac-
tical operation of the same, and if you believe from the evidence in this
case that said plane was, at and immediately prior to the time of the happen-
ing of the accident in question, being operated and controlled with the high-
est degree of care consistent with the practical operation of the same, then
in such case you should find for the defendant, operation of the plane, of
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course, including the giving of the signals that the pilots were required to
give if they knew or had reason to believe that rough weather conditions
were just ahead.
You are instructed that the plaintiffs assumed the risks necessarily in-
cident to traveling in the air, known as perils of the air, when the plane is
being operated with the highest degree of skill and care commensurate with
the practical operation of the plane, and if you find from the evidence that
the plane at the time it hit a downdraft was being operated with the highest
degree of skill and care, commensurate with the practical operation of the
plane, but, nevertheless, the plaintiffs were injured, then your verdict must
be for the defendant, that, of course, merely indicating that the pilots cannot
control the air conditions, cannot control winds and storms, downdrafts, or
things of that sort, but the fact that they cannot control those things and
that passengers may be injured in those things does not relieve pilots from
exercising the duty to avoid the consequences of them, to protect against them
to the test of their ability and to take such action as ought to be required of a
reasonable pilot under the circumstances whenever he knows or has reason to
know or to believe that dangerous conditions are about to be encountered.
The jury is instructed that while the law demands the utmost care for
the safety of passengers, it does not require the defendant to exercise all the
care, skill and diligence of which the human mind can conceive, nor such as
will free the transportation of passengers from all possible perils. That is a
simple way of stating that there are dangers in all these lines of transporta-
tion, that dangers exist, and that the practical operation of none of these
agencies, ships or trains or airplanes, can relieve it of the practical fact that
there are dangers in the operation of instrumentalities of such kinds.
The jury is instructed that an unavoidable accident is one that is not
occasioned in any degree, either remotely or directly, by the want of such
skill or care as the law holds the defendant is bound to exercise, and the
defendant cannot" be held to be negligent merely because it fails to provide
against an accident which it could not reasonably be expected, to foresee, and
if you find from the evidence in this case that the injuries sustained by the
plaintiffs were due to an unavoidable accident, then your verdict must be
for the defendant.
So I call attention again to the real point in the case; the duty of these
pilots here was to exercise the highest care with respect to matters over
which they had control in order to carry the passengers safely to their
destination and to use like care to warn the passengers against any unusual
or dangerous condition with respect to which the passengers could protect
themselves if warned. The primary question that stands throughout this
whole case is whether as reasonable men skilled in piloting planes the pilot
and co-pilot had warning or had reason to believe that the plane was coming
into a place where there was or was likely to be rough or turbulent conditions
and 'that the pilots had notice or warning of such conditions as to which
they ought to warn their passengers, in time to give effective warning to the
passengers.
There are two or three other matters that I also call to your attention.
Of course, if you do not find that the defendant here was guilty of negli-
gence, that ends the case.
If you are satisfied that the defendant through its pilots was guilty of
negligence, then you would have another question to consider, and that would
be to assess and determine what the damages in the case ought to be.
If you find for the plaintiff your verdict would be in such amount as
you consider would fairly compensate for such injury as you found he sus-
tained. That would apply in each case. To determine the amount of damages
to be awarded you would be authorized to take into consideration the pain
and suffering such as you found the plaintiff sustained or will sustain, ex-
penses such as you found he has incurred or will incur, and any other pecuni-
ary loss which you found he has sustained or will sustain. Damages in a case
of this kind are not imposed by way of punishment but are imposed by way
of compensation for losses sustained, and in that connection I give you
another instruction:
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Sympathy for the alleged injuries and disabilities claimed by the plaintiffs,
if any, from whatever source they may have come, should have no influence
upon you in determining whether or not the defendant is liable, or, if liable,
control in any way your verdict. Both liability and damages are matters to
be determined by the evidence, and, under the instructions of the Court,
prejudices, sympathy or any outside matter should not affect your judg-
ment. In other words, it is your duty to give every question in the case a
calm, careful and conscientious consideration, uninfluenced- by sympathy or
any consideration other than the evidence and the law as given to you in
these instructions.
Something was said in some part of the argument about the ability or lack
of ability of anybody connected with the case or of any part connected with it
to make compensation. That has not anything to do with you. You are just
coldly, seriously analyzing the evidence, finding what the truth about it is, and
then drawing your verdict, your conclusion as to what is just, what ought to
be done in the case; so you will not concern yourself about other points in
the matter except to reach a conclusion and verdict based upon the evidence
and rendered in accordance with the law.
These are all the matters I' had in mind to call to your attention. If
there is anything in particular-
MR. DOHERTY (interposing): Mr. Yeatman referred in his argument to
contributory negligence. I did not ask you, but-
THE COURT (interposing) : I did not give any instruction because there
is no evidence, so far as I can see, of contributory negligence, and nobody
asked for such instruction.
MR. YEATMAN: Your Honor, I suppose you will instruct the jury there
will be a separate verdict in each case.
TIlE COURT: The jury understand that there are two cases here. You
will return a verdict in each case, just as if you were trying them separately;
and you understand, of course, you are to select a foreman to report the
case. You may take the case now and consider your verdict.
(Thereupon at 11:20 a.m. the jury retired to consider its verdict.)
(At 2:05 p. m. the jury assembled in the court room and, in the presence
of the Court and counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendant, the
following occurred:)
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, have the jury agreed upon a
verdict ?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Yes, sir.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: How do you find in the case of George P.
Kimmel against the Pennsylvanit Airlines?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: We find for the defendant.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: How do you find in the case of Homer J.
Byrd against the Pennsylvanda Airlines?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: We find for the defendant.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Members of the jury, your foreman says that
your verdict in each of these cases is for the defendant.
Is that your verdict? So say each and all of you?
(No member of the jury indicated the contrary.)
THE COURT: I would like to say to the jury that the Court appreciates
the careful attention you gave to the case.
(Thereupon the instant hearing was concluded.)
DIGESTS
Insurance-Interpretation of "Participating in Aeronautics"-Failure
to Call Attention of Court to Controlling Case or Important Provisions in
Policy and Effect on Granting of New Trial.-[Missouril This is an
action on an insurance policy for death of plaintiff's intestate while riding
in an aeroplane. Body of policy did not cover injury sustained while par-
ticipating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics. Rider on
insurance policy, which was not at first called to attention of court, covered
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
injury received while insured was riding as a fare-paying passenger in a
licensed plane. From a judgment denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial
after a directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held: Judgment
reversed and cause remanded with directions to grant plaintiff a new trial.
Sulzbachcr v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 F. (2d) 122 (Circuit Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Feb. 18, 1937).
On motion for a new trial the court's attention was first called to the
Gregory case (78 F. (2d) 522), where the court held that one being trans-
ported on an aeroplane as a passenger was not participating in aeronautics;
also to the provision in the rider to the policy that insurance covered in-
sured while riding as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed aeroplane. While
it is true that generally speaking the court will not on appeal consider a
question not presented to the lower court, yet this court, to prevent a mis-
carriage of justice may notice a plain error. It is apparent that the court
would not have granted the motion for a directed verdict had its attention
been called to the decision in the Gregory case. Under the facts disclosed
by the record, it was the duty of the lower court to consider a motion for a
new trial on its merits. In the instant case there has been a failure or refusal
to exercise the discretion vested in the trial court to consider and to act
upon motion for a new trial.
Negligence-Municipal Corporations-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-[Tennesee]
In an action by two plaintiffs against City of Knoxville, and another, the
declaration avers that City of Knoxville leased an airport to a corporation,
which entered into an agreement with one Betty Lund to conduct commercial
flights and sightseeing trips; that the injuries to one plaintiff and the death
of plaintiff's intestate were caused by the negligence of defendants, due to the
fact that aircraft in use was not airworthy and not equipped with emergency
or safety belts, which'conditions the defendants knew or should have known.
Defendants filed pleas of not guilty. On verdict by jury for defendants, the
plaintiffs appeal in error. Held: The court found no reversible error in the
record, and affirmed the judgment. Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, 99 S.
W. (2d) 557 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, Dec. 21,
1935).
The city owed the duty to supervise the operation and detect and prevent
operative negligence, but as it was exonerated by the jury from affirmative
acts of negligence, it is not liable for injuries to passengers because of pilot's
negligent acts which could not reasonably have been foreseen and prevented.
There is no proof that it was the duty of the defendants to provide belts
or to see that they were provided when the machine was not engaged in
stunting. There being no duty resting upon the parties to provide the belts,
then the failure to provide them will not be a negligent act. The trial court
correctly concluded that these acts of negligence should be withdrawn from
the jury. This is not a case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur for it is a common and not an unusual occurrence for airplanes to
stall and fall while in operation, and without the intervention of any act
upon the part of the operator. As to the question of whether the plaintiffs
assumed the risk of flight, the defendants are not insurers of the safety of the
passengers, and are responsible only for their negligence.
Trespass-Servitude-Flight of Aircraft-Rights of Landowner and
Aviator.-[Federal] The United States Supreme Court on February 1,
1937, denied the petitions of F. R. Hinman and Nannie Hinman for writs of
certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 84 F. (2d) 755).
F. R. Hinman and Nannie Hinman, Petitioners v. Pacific Air Transport;
Same v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, 57 S. Ct. 431 (Feb. 1, 1937).
See note on the cases in 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 624 (1936).
